Raymond A. Zilinskas
On 22 March 2012, Russian president-elect Vladimir Putin promised to develop new weapons based on advanced technologies, including genetics. Having just completed a history of the Soviet biological warfare (BW) program with Milton Leitenberg, I found Putin's promise exceedingly threatening. It could signal a new Russian military effort to develop third-generation biological weapons agents, building on the fırst-and second-generation BW programs of the former Soviet Union.
It is important to note that pathogens by themselves are not weapons. Instead, a biological weapon consists of three principal componentsthe payload that consists of formulated pathogens and fıller, a munition that conveys the payload to the target population, and a mechanism that disperses the payload onto the target population. Since there have been no defectors or revealing publications from the Soviet Ministry of Defense (MOD), little is known about its biological weapons. Even so, we learned about two of them. Most of what we know about Soviet BW activities pertains to the pathogens that were weaponized at civilian and, to a lesser extent, MOD facilities.
First-Generation Soviet BW Program: 1928 -1972
During the fırst-generation BW program, Soviet weapon scientists applied classical microbiology techniques, including mutation, selection, and propagation, to enhance well-known pathogens and better adapt them for weapons applications (a process called weaponizing). Beginning in 1928, the Soviet BW program focused on weaponizing Bacillus anthracis and Clostridium botulinum, as well as on developing effıcient disinfection methods and studying human immunity to pathogens. Some studies were also conducted on Vibrio cholerae and Yersinia pestis.
The fırst Soviet biological weapon was based on B. anthracis. However, by the early 1970s, the Soviet BW arsenal most likely included weapons based on variola and Venezuelan equine encephalitis viruses (VEEV) as well as Francisella tularensis, Y. pestis, Coxiella burnetii, Brucella suis, and botulinum toxin.
The major institutions responsible for these weaponization efforts were three MOD microbiological institutes: the Scientifıc Research Institute of Epidemiology and Hygiene in Kirov, the Scientifıc Research Institute of Medicine of the MOD in Zagorsk, and the Military Technical Scientifıc Research Institute in Sverdlovsk. The weapons developed at these institutes were tested at Aralsk-7, which was the codename for an open-air test site located on Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea (Fig. 1) . Some of the institutes belonging to the anti-plague system had impor- Ovchinnikov proposed that Ferment be carried out in the civilian sphere to hide it in plain sight. In other words, the new BW-related facilities that were soon to be built and staffed would be openly identifıed as components of an ostensibly civilian system called Biopreparat, which seemingly would be placed under the authority of the Main Board of Biotechnological Industry, or Glavmikrobioprom, a sub-ministry that had been established in 1966 to oversee biotechnology industry. This approach was typical for the Soviet Union, which operated a "legend" system that gave every classifıed activity an innocuous cover story. Thus, Biopreparat's legend was that it performed R&D related to vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics. In reality, the MOD 15th Directorate directed both the offensive and defensive aspects of the BW program, including Biopreparat's Ferment and the anti-plague system's Problem 5, until the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991-and for some time thereafter.
Three Biopreparat Programs with Lasting Impact
As the Biopreparat institutes were coming online in the middle 1970s, the 15th Directorate found it necessary to set up subsidiary programs within Ferment with specifıc objectives. Three of them in particular-codenamed Bonfıre, Factor, and Chimera-bear on the legacy of the Soviet BW program. Some examples of the R&D they conducted are illustrative of Ferment's research activities.
Bonfıre was charged with developing multiantibiotic-resistant bacterial strains, strains of bacteria and viruses with modifıed antigenic structures, and bacterial and viral strains that were hardier than wild strains. Its specifıc accomplishments include the development of strains of B. anthracis, F. tularensis, and others that were resistant to fıve or more antibiotics; a strain of B. anthracis that was made hemolytic by transferring a hemolysin gene from B. cereus; and an F1-minus strain of Y. pestis that had an altered surface antigen intended to complicate efforts to diagnose and treat infections that it might cause.
Factor's goals included development of bacteria and viruses that possessed higher virulence than their wild progenitors, were hardier than their wild progenitors, and exhibited unexpected disease presentations and outcomes. Its achievements included development of a method for coating F. tularensis cells with Protein A to protect them from human immunodefenses, a strain of Y. pestis whose virulence was enhanced by addition of a diphtheria toxin gene into its genome, and a strain of Legionella pneumophila that was genetically engineered to secrete a peptide that could activate immune cells capable of destroying the myelin sheath of nerve cells in hosts, causing symptoms similar to those of multiple sclerosis.
Chimera, mandated with developing viruses containing exotic genes, produced vaccinia viruses that contained virulence gene(s) from VEEV and ebolavirus, respectively.
When President Boris Yeltsin closed down the Soviet BW program in December 1992, Biopreparat was running fıve major R&D institutes, which were supported by approximately 40 different kinds of facilities, including huge applied institutions that conducted closed and open-air testing; gigantic bacterial and viral production plants; and specialized units to design and construct equipment and instruments. The fıve Biopreparat institutes were the Institute of Applied Microbiology (SRCAM) in Obolensk (bacterial studies) (Fig. 2) ; Institute of Molecular Biology (Vector) in Koltsovo (viral studies); Institute of Highly Pure Biopreparations (IHPB) in Leningrad (peptide studies and formulations); Institute of Engineering Immunology (IEI) in Lyubuchany (immunological system studies and vaccines), and Progress Scientifıc and Production Base (SNOPB) in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan (industrial-scale bacterial fermentations) (Fig. 3) . Biopreparat employed between 40,000 and 60,000 scientists, technicians, and administrative personnel. The MOD BW program employed approximately an additional 10,000 in the three MOD institutes named above and Aralsk-7. We do not know how many people worked for Ekology, but estimate it was at least several thousand. Approximately 10,000 persons staffed the six anti-plague institutes and their many subsidiary stations; however, by far most of these persons conducted research and fıeld work that had no connection to BW.
We are familiar with two Soviet biological weapons. The biological bomblet called Gshch-304 was manufactured by the Ministry of Medium Machine Building factories and could be armed with either bacterial or viral formulations. It was a 12-cm diameter shiny sphere that weighed 0.432 kg, had an outer shell of 3-mm thick aluminum with three protrusions (Fig. 4) , and consisted of two equal parts, with one half threaded to be screwed into the other. When assembled, it carried a biological payload plus three packets of TNT. After falling to the ground or other hard surface, it would bounce and the fırst TNT packet would detonate, breaking apart its two halves. A split second after separation, the remaining TNT packets in each of those compartments would detonate and disperse the payload as an aerosol. Prevailing winds would carry aerosol particles over a wider area. We also know of one BW weapon system (but of unknown designation) that relied on sprayers for dispersing biological agents. Its platform was an Antonov AN-24 twin-engine aircraft that was specially equipped to carry a pod attached atop a pallet in its bomb bay. The pod was fılled with 20 containers, each of which carried 20 liters of a liquid formulation. Each container had a wide opening that was capped to prevent the payload from spilling during transport. At the beginning of a dispersal run, a mechanism would remove the caps from the containers, the pod-carrying pallet would be lowered from the bay, and the liquid in those containers would be drawn out by the Venturi effect generated by the aircraft's slipstream as it flew over the target area at a selected altitude and speed.
The Soviet Legacy in Russia
Shortly after Boris Yeltsin became Russia's fırst President in 1991, he revealed that the Soviet Union had supported an offensive BW program in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) that it had ratifıed in 1975. The Russian government also for the fırst time submitted an annual declaration to the United Nations in 1992 that provided details of the illegal Soviet BW program.
Notwithstanding overwhelming evidence to the contrary, however, offıcials of the Putin administration have consistently asserted that the USSR never supported an offensive BW program. By themselves, these assertions might be dismissed as an example of the country seeking to disavow part of its unsavory history-except for Putin's promise to acquire weapons based on "genetics." No source, of which we are aware, has clarifıed what Putin meant by that statement. In my opinion, it has to do with applying molecular biology techniques that were developed since the Soviet second-generation BW program was closed by Yeltsin.
In general, during the 1980s and early 1990s, researchers used genetic engineering to transfer genes expressing proteins from one microorganism to another. Scientists at Biopreparat, for example, transferred genes that encoded proteins that could endow recipient microorganisms with various characteristics such as antibiotic resistance and enhanced virulence. With techniques developed since the early 2000s, it is theoretically possible for scientists to control systemic functions of humans or other target hosts. For example, analysis based on single-nucleotide polymorphisms can be used to identify specifıc types of variations in human DNA sequences. In theory, an ill-willed scientist might use such information to develop small RNA molecules that interfere with genes that control behavior or immunological defense systems. Of high importance to biological weapons development, protein expression has experienced astounding transformative advances.
Bacterial and viral pathogens that Soviet scientists weaponized during the second-generation BW program presumably are stored in culture collections maintained as part of Russia's military and, possibly, anti-plague institutes. Further, the "recipes" for developing, testing, and producing biological weapons are most likely deposited in MOD archives. To this day, Russian offıcials have not allowed foreigners to enter any of its three MOD institutes (Aralsk-7 was closed down in 1992). Similarly, access to Russia's fıve antiplague institutes has been extremely limited. A Swedish group once visited the administrative building of one anti-plague institute called Mikrob. Additionally, a Swedish researcher did experiments with F. tularensis at the Rostov-onDon Anti-Plague Institute in 1991. But in effect, MOD and anti-plague institutions in Russia are as inaccessible to outsiders today as they were in Soviet times.
To sum up, it is diffıcult to conceive of a weapon based on "genetic" principles except in the context of the BWC, which means that any attempt to develop weapons based on genetics would perforce be a violation of its Article 1, which permits developments in microbiology only for defensive and peacefully directed purposes. BW-related resources stored in secret institutes could, if coupled with modern "genetics" techniques, provide a ready base for Russian scientists to establish a third-generation BW program. In view of this possibility, it behooves BWC State Parties to attempt to dissuading the Putin administration from even entertaining the idea of acquiring weapons based on genetics.
However, lessons from history in this regard are not auspicious. Western intelligence offıcials were largely ignorant of the Soviet offensive BW program until after the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak in 1979, but at that time only had indirect information about it. It was not until the 1989 defection of Vladimir Pasechnik that U.K. and U.S. intelligence agencies learned about Biopreparat and Ferment. Even after this knowledge was used by the U.S. and U.K. governments to pressure Gorbachev and then Yeltsin, these efforts failed to stop the MOD from continuing to develop BW weapons. Also, after the governments of Russia, U.K, and U.S. had in September 1992 entered into a trilateral agreement to visit each other's biological facilities, this process was terminated after the MOD refused entry to foreigners to its three BW-related institutes. Based on that history, it is reasonable to assume that it will be extremely diffıcult for Western countries to discover a new Russian BW program. Moreover, were such a program suspected, the Russian offıcials would likely deny its existence and, in any case, the MOD would forbid foreigners from entering facilities where suspect activities were taking place. Finally, the Putin administration appears to have had no qualms about violating the 1994 Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances that, among other provisions requires Russia "to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine." In view of this blatant disregard of international law, I cannot but worry that were the Putin administration to perceive a utility for weapons based on genetics, it would as effortlessly violate the BWC as did the Soviet Union.
